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IV 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
RICHARD DALE HOUSTON, : Case No. 20020526-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a conviction for Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999), in the Third Judicial District Court, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Ann. M. Boyden, Judge, presiding.1 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)0) (Supp. 2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW. AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue: Under section 77-29-1 of the Utah Code, charges pending against a prisoner must 
be dismissed if the prisoner is not tried within 120 days of his written request for 
disposition. The only exception to this is when there is good cause for the delay. Here, 
1
 A copy of the Minutes of the "Sentence, Judgment, Commitment1' is attached in 
Addendum A. 
good cause did not support the delay because it was caused by ill-timed State motions 
and administrative errors. Did the trial court err in failing to dismiss the charge? 
Standard of Review: Overall, this Court applies the abuse of discretion standard to a 
trial court's decision about whether to dismiss charges under the 120-day disposition 
statute. State v. Coleman. 2001 UT App 281, TJ3, 34 P.3d 790. However, underlying 
conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness, and underlying findings of fact are 
reviewed for clear error. Id. at [^4. 
Preservation: This issue was preserved at R. 143-48, 271 [2-3]. 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution is relevant to the issue on 
appeal. The Amendment reads, in pertinent part: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public t r i a l . . . . 
U.S. Const. Amend VI. 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution is relevant to the issue on appeal. 
The provision reads, in pertinent part: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the r ight . . . to have a speedy 
public t r i a l . . . . 
UT Const, art. I, § 12. 
Section 77-17-13 of the Utah Code, "Expert Testimony," is relevant to the issue 
2 
on appeal. The text of that statute is attached in Addendum B. 
Section 77-29-1 of the Utah Code, "Disposition of Pending Charge," is 
determinative to the issue on appeal. The text of that statute is attached in Addendum C. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The chronology of events is critical to the issue, so the proceedings are listed in 
order as follows: 
October 31, 2001 
November 29, 2001 
December 8, 2001 
December 14, 2001 
December 20, 2001 
January 15, 2002 
Mr. Houston is taken into custody on 
several charges, including aggravated 
robbery. R. 6. 
Mr. Houston is charged by information with 
aggravated robbery. R. 3-5. 
Mr. Houston, while in prison, executes a 
"Notice and Request for Disposition of 
Pending Charge(s)" for the charge of 
aggravated robbery. R. 13. 
The prison records office receives the 
"Notice and Request for Disposition of 
Pending Charge(s)" and forwards it to the 
Salt Lake City Prosecuting Attorney along 
with a "Certificate of Inmate Status." R. 13-
15. 
Preliminary hearing is set for January 15, 
2002. R. 16. 
Preliminary hearing begins. After testimony 
by two witnesses, hearing is continued to the 
following day. R. 255 [44-46]. 
3 
January 16, 2002 
January 24, 2002 
February 11,2002 
February 25, 2002 
February 27, 2002 
March 11,2002 
April 12, 2002 
April 18, 2002 
April 22, 2002 
April 24, 2002 
Prison fails to transport Mr. Houston to the 
court. Hearing continued to January 24 th. Id. 
at 46-48. 
Preliminary hearing is completed. Mr. 
Houston is bound over on the charge of 
aggravated robbery. IcL at 93-94. 
Arraignment is set for February 11, 2002. R. 
30. 
Arraignment is continued to allow for 
appointment of conflict counsel. R. 259. 
Mr. Houston is arraigned and pleads not 
guilty. R. 260-61. Jury trial is set for March 
13-15, 2002. R. 40, 260. 
The State files a "Notice of Expert Witness." 
R. 41-42. 
Pretrial conference is held and, over defense 
counsel's objection, trial is postponed until 
April 24-26. R. 272 [12-15, 20]. 
The 120-day period afforded the State to 
bring Mr. Houston to trial expires. R. 13-15, 
85,143,271 [6]. 
The defense counsel files a "Motion to 
Dismiss for Violation of Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers" and a supporting 
memorandum. R. 143-48. 
A hearing is held on the Motion to Dismiss 
and the trial court denies the Motion, ruling 
that the delay of the trial was not 
unreasonable. R. 271 [7-8]. 
Amended information is filed, and jury trial 
begins. R. 151,159. 
4 
April 26, 2002 Jury trial concludes. The jury returns a 
verdict of guilty for aggravated robbery. R. 
206. 
July 1, 2002 Mr. Houston is sentenced. R. 226-27. 
July 9, 2002 Mr. Houston files a timely Notice of 
Appeal. R. 228-29. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On October 23, 2001 Rafael Duran went to Sociables, a State Street bar, with his 
friend Al Diaz. R. 256 [105-06]. Mr. Duran had just received rent money from his 
tenants, and the money was in his wallet. Id, at 107-08. He also had his cell phone with 
him. Id at 107. 
At the bar, someone borrowed his phone to make a call. Id. at 12. Then the 
borrower passed the phone around to several of his friends, who also made calls. IcL Two 
of the borrowers were Mr. Houston and Gabriel Valenzuela. IcL at 136. 
During the course of the evening, Mr. Houston and Mr. Valenzuela noticed that 
Mr. Duran had a lot of money. Id. They met in the bar's bathroom and agreed to rob Mr. 
Duran. Id at 137. Unaware of this, Mr. Duran continued watching his cell phone as it 
passed from user to user. Id. at 123-24. Then someone took his phone outside and didn't 
return. Id at 124. That person may have been Mr. Houston.2 Or, it may have been Mr. 
2
 At the preliminary hearing, Mr. Duran could not remember the last person to use his 
phone. R. 255 [20]. However, at trial, Mr. Duran indicated that Mr. Houston was the last person 
to use his phone. R. 256 [127]. 
5 
Valenzuela.3 Becoming concerned, Mr. Duran went outside. R. 256 [113]. 
Suddenly, something flew towards his head. R. 255 [10]. After that, he remembers 
nothing until he woke up in the hospital about two weeks later. IcL at 10-11. When he 
awoke, he found that he had suffered seven knife injuries4 and a head injury. R. 257 
[210]. Also, he had undergone surgery to relieve the bleeding on his brain. IcL at 216. His 
wallet and cell phone were gone and have never been located. R. 256 [115]. Mr. Duran 
himself cannot identify who attacked him, or describe any details of the attack.5 
However, witnesses provide some pieces of the puzzle. Immediately after the 
attack, several men came outside and found Mr. Duran lying unconscious. The first 
people to find him were two unidentified Hispanic men, who found him lying near the 
door. R. 257 [221]. One came back inside, shouting, ,f[c]all 911, call 911!" IcL Hearing 
this, Scott Talbot, an acquaintance of Mr. Duran's, went outside and saw him lying 
unconscious. IdL Mr. Talbot didn't see any blood at first, and so he gently tapped Mr. 
Duran's face to wake him up. Id. Mr. Duran did not respond. Id. Then some blood and 
saliva starting coming out of his mouth and he "didn't look good at all." IcL at 222. Mr. 
3
 Apparently, Mr. Valenzuela originally told an investigator that he was in the bar when 
Mr. Duran went outside. R. 255 [71]. But at trial, he testified that he was the person who 
borrowed the cell phone and went out the door with it. R. 256 [137]. 
4
 The knife injuries include two cuts on his back, three on his upper chest, one on his left 
forearm, and one on his left arm. R. 257 [210]. 
5
 R. 256 [114-32]. Mr. Duran did, however, identify Mr. Houston in a photo line-up 
prepared by police. State's Ex. 23. He testified that Mr. Houston was the last person to use his 
phone. R. 256 [127]. 
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Talbot immediately pulled out his cell phone and called 911. Id. 222. 
About that time, Mr. Talbot saw a dark-colored Ford Ranger truck speeding down 
the alley towards State Street. R. 257 [222-23]. The truck almost ran over Mr. Duran, but 
it swerved to miss him. Id at 223. Mr. Talbot saw two people in the truck, but did not get 
a good look at them. IcL However, another bar patron, Richard Gates, had a better look. 
R. 257 [238]. He testified that he had seen the two men run up to the truck, climb in, and 
speed off down the alley. Id. at 238-44. Mr. Gates said that they both looked Hispanic, 
and he thought that one of them had blonde hair. IcL at 243-44. But he did not see them 
well enough to identify them. Id. at 244. 
Mr. Diaz came outside and saw Mr. Duran lying on the ground. R. 256 [164]. He 
also saw Mr. Talbot calling for help. R. 256 [165]. The police and ambulance arrived 
almost immediately. Id. 
The police gathered evidence and witness statements. They spoke with Mr. Diaz 
and he told them about the men who had borrowed Mr. Duran's cell phone. R. 256 [162, 
165]. He described two of these men. One had been wearing baggy levis, a white knit 
shirt with blue sleeves, and two braids in his hair. R. 256 [163]. Mr. Diaz later identified 
this man as Mr. Valenzuela. State's ex. 25. The other man was wearing a grey sweatshirt 
with "Yankees" written across the front. R. 256 [163]. This man was identified as Mr. 
Houston.6 
6
 Mr. Diaz did not chose Mr. Houston from a photo line-up. State's Ex. 26. However, Mr. 
Diaz testified at trial that he was positive that Mr. Houston was the person in the "Yankees" 
7 
The police also spoke with Pablo Acevedo, who had accompanied Mr. Valenzuela 
and Mr. Houston. R. 258 [420]. He said that he didn't know Mr. Valenzuela and Mr. 
Houston, and that they had joined his group at Gold's Bar. IcL_ at 421. From there they 
had all driven to Sociables. Id, He added that Mr. Valenzuela and Mr. Houston had a red 
Ford Ranger. Id at 421-22. 
While witnesses were being interviewed, the police noticed some fresh blood 
drippings leading from the scene down the alleyway behind the businesses. R. 256 [158]. 
The blood stopped between two vehicles that were parked in the parking lot. Id_ 159. 
There was also a blood smear along the wall in front of these vehicles. Id. 160. The 
police collected photos and samples of this blood. R. 257 [251-52, 253-59, 287-88]. 
They also collected Mr. Rafael's clothing and took photographs of his clothing and his 
wounds. Id. at 262-66. 
Later, the police located the green Ford Ranger that the robbers had used to flee 
the scene.7 There were spatters of blood inside and outside the truck. The police took 
samples of this blood. R. 257 [278-83]. They also took photos of the truck. R. 258 [426]. 
The truck was registered to Mr. Houston. R. 257 [236]. 
After gathering blood samples from the scene, the victim's clothing, and the truck, 
the samples were prepared for DNA testing. R. 257 [308-23]. A substantial blood sample 
sweatshirt. R. 256 [163]. 
7
 Mr. Houston's girlfriend, Stephanie Piep, provided the truck to police. R. 258 [425]. 
8 
was taken from Mr. Houston to compare with the samples. R. 257 [293-94]. Through 
DNA testing, police found that Mr. Houston's blood matched that on the steering wheel 
of his truck, the wall facing the parking lot at Sociables, Mr. Duran's shirt, and Mr. 
Duran's pants.8 Also, Mr. Houston had a large open cut between the thumb and 
forefinger of his right hand. State's Ex. 21. 
Mr. Houston and Mr. Valenzuela were charged with the crime. R. 3-5. 
Mr. Valenzuela gave the police an interview. He told them that, at Sociables, Mr. 
Houston had approached him in the bathroom and had said "that a guy out there had lots 
of money, or had some money." R. 258 [432]. Mr. Valenzuela had asked, ,f[s]o, what, do 
you want to jack him?" Id. Mr. Houston had replied, "I'm down for whatever." Id. Mr. 
Valenzuela said that he then went back out into the bar, but worried that Mr. Houston 
was too "antsy" and needed to relax. Id. at 433. Soon after, he looked around and did not 
see Mr. Houston in the bar. Id. He said that he went outside and found Mr. Houston in a 
physical confrontation with Mr. Duran. Id. at 433-34. Mr. Houston had a knife. Id. at 
435. Mr. Valenzuela started towards Mr. Duran, and Mr. Duran said, "[w]hat, you too?" 
Id. at 434. Then Mr. Valenzuela punched Mr. Duran. Id. At that point, he "looked a little 
woozy" and fell down. Id. Mr. Valenzuela and Mr. Houston ran to their truck and drove 
8
 These samples were labeled Ql through Q6. Sample Ql was taken from the steering 
wheel of the truck. R. 257 [339]. Q2 was taken from the wall at Sociables. Id at 340. Q3 was 
another stain from the wall. Id. at 341. Q4 was taken from Mr. Duran's shirt. Id Q5 was taken 
from Mr. Duran's other shirt (he had been wearing two shirts). Id And, Q6 was taken from Mr. 
Duran's pants. Id at 342. DNA profiles were made for each of these samples, and the profiles 
matched the DNA profile of Mr. Houston's blood. R. 257 [351-52]. 
9 
away. Id. at 435. Mr. Valenzuela said that, as Mr. Houston drove, a cut on his right hand 
was spurting blood.9 
Later, under oath at Mr. Houston's trial, Mr. Valenzuela testified differently. He 
said that he was the one who had borrowed Mr. Duran's cell phone, R. 256 [136], and 
that it was he who went outside with the phone. Id_ He also testified that Mr. Duran 
followed him outside, but that Mr. Houston did not join them. Id. Then Mr. Valenzuela 
started fighting with Mr. Duran. Id. Mr. Valenzuela testified that he had a knife, and he 
stabbed Mr. Duran and took his money. Id. at 137-38, 150. Then Mr. Houston came out, 
and he and Mr. Houston got into the Ford Ranger and sped away. Id_ at 138. Mr. 
Valenzuela said that he kept most of the money. Id. at 150-51. 
The jury convicted Mr. Houston of aggravated robbery, R. 206, but did not find 
that the State had proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Houston had used a knife 
in the crime. R. 205. Mr. Houston was sentenced to five years to life in prison. R. 226-
27. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Mr. Houston's conviction should be reversed because the State didn't bring Mr. 
Houston to trial within 120 days of his written request for 120-day disposition. And, 
while delays may be justified by good cause, there was not good cause for any of the 
9
 R. 258 [435-36]. Before his trial, Mr. Valenzuela accepted a plea bargain and pled guilty 
to the charge of second degree felony robbery. R. 256 [148]. 
10 
delays that in this case. There were three delays. 
First, a delay was caused when the prison failed to transport Mr. Houston to the 
continuation of the preliminary hearing on January 16, 2002. The preliminary hearing 
had started the day before, but was continued to the next day when time ran short. R. 255 
[44]. Then, when court reconvened on the 16th, it was discovered that the prison had 
refused to transport Mr. Houston. Id. at 46. So, the continuation was rescheduled for 
January 24th. IcL at 47-50. Although this delay is not the fault of the prosecutor or trial 
court, the time still counts towards the 120 days because it was an administrative error, 
and such errors do not toll the 120 days. State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911, 915 (Utah 1998). 
The second delay was caused by the State's filing of a "Motion for a Joint Trial 
with Dual Juries." R. 31-39. In the Motion the State asked that Mr. Houston be tried with 
his co-defendant even though the co-defendant had given a confession that implicated 
Mr. Houston. R. 31-32. This necessitated the appointment of conflict counsel for either 
Mr. Houston or his co-defendant, and this caused a 14-day postponement of the 
arraignment. R. 259. So, the delay is attributable to the State, and so the delay does not 
toll the 120-day period. 
The third delay was also caused by the State. This is because the State wanted to 
present expert witness testimony at trial, but had neglected to give Mr. Houston the 
statutorily-required 30-day notice. R. 272 [4]. To mend this, the State asked for a 
continuance to allow the 30 days to pass. IcL The defense counsel strongly objected 
11 
because he wished to preserve Mr. Houston's request for disposition within 120 days. Id_ 
at 7, 12-13. However, the trial court granted the continuance. Id. at 17-18. The trial was 
then rescheduled for April 24 th through the 26th, more than a month from the original 
March 13th through the 15th dates. IdL at 18-19. 
None of these delays is supported by good cause because they were not caused by 
the defendant or by unforeseen circumstances near the trial date. And, under the case 
law, these are the only justifications for a late trial. State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, 
Tfl4, 34 P.3d 790. In these circumstances, this case should have been dismissed under the 
120-day disposition statute. 
ARGUMENT 
MR, HOUSTON'S CONVICTION SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE 
THE STATE DID NOT BRING HIM TO TRIAL WITHIN 120 DAYS OF 
HIS REQUEST FOR DISPOSITION OF THE CHARGE 
The State failed to prosecute Mr. Houston within 120 days after he requested 
disposition of the charge. In fact, not only did the State fail to prosecute within 120 days, 
it actually caused two of the three delays which resulted in the late trial. So, the late trial 
cannot be justified and the trial court should have dismissed the charge against Mr. 
Houston. This is shown by the law. 
The controlling law is the 120-day disposition statute. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 
12 
(1999). This statute stems from federal and state constitutional rights to a speedy trial,10 
and is meant to "more precisely define what is meant by speedy t r ia l . . . . " State v. 
Lindsay, 2000 UT App 379, [^6, 18 P.3d 504 (citations omitted). More practically, the 
statute also prevents law enforcers from "holding over the head of a prisoner undisposed 
of charges against him." L± (citations omitted). Further, it compels prompt prosecution,11 
and encourages trials "while witnesses are available and their memories are fresh." 
Lindsay, 2000 UT App 379, ^ [6 (citations omitted). 
These goals are implicit in the words of the statute. The statute provides that, 
whenever a prisoner has a pending charge, the prisoner may compel the prosecutor to try 
him within 120 days by delivering a written request to the warden or other authorized 
person: 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state 
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there 
is pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or 
information, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or 
custodial officer in authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a 
written demand specifying the nature of the charge and the court wherein it 
is pending and requesting disposition of the pending charge, he shall be 
entitled to have the charge brought to trial within 120 days of the date of 
delivery of written notice. 
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand 
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be 
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, 
10
 State v. Viles. 702 P.2d 1175, 1176 (Utah 1985); State v. Tavlor. 538 P.2d 310, 313 
(Utah 1975). 
11
 Viles, 702 P.2d at 1176. 
13 
to the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff 
or custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so 
notified, provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of 
commitment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1) & (2) (1999). 
Besides outlining the procedure for making a 120-day disposition request, this 
statute also makes clear that, once the request is made, the prosecutor has the burden of 
pushing the case forward to meet the deadline. State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, ^ |14, 
34 P.3d 790; State v. Petersen. 810 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1991). This means that the State 
may not stand passively by while clerical errors delay the case, or while time simply 
passes. State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911,915 (Utah 1998). The State must schedule all 
necessary appearances within the 120-day period, and inform the court that prompt 
scheduling is necessary because of the 120-day disposition notice. Coleman. 2001 UT 
App 281, [^14; Petersen, 810 P.2d 425. The State must also actively avoid delays, and if 
the delays are necessary, the State must minimize them. Coleman. 2001 UT App 281, 
K14; Petersen, 810 P.2d 425. 
Of course, the prosecutor's duty to try the case within 120 days is not absolute. 
The 120-day disposition statute allows for delays that have good cause. The statute says: 
After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the 
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown 
in open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be 
granted any reasonable continuance. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(3) (1999). The question becomes, therefore, whether any 
14 
delays are supported by good cause. This has been the principal issue in several appeals 
under the 120-day disposition statute, and some general guidelines have emerged. Most 
importantly, it has been determined that a good-cause delay is one that is either: (1) 
caused by the defendant, or (2) "a relatively short delay caused by unforeseen problems 
arising immediately prior to trial." Coleman. 2001 UT App 281, [^14; Petersen. 810 P.2d 
at 426. 
As a practical matter, some good-cause delays have included those caused by 
defendants' motions,12 those made to accommodate defense counsels' schedules,13 and 
those caused by defendants' requests for continuances. State v. Phathammavong. 860 
P.2d 1001, 1004-05 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); State v. Bullock . 699 P.2d 753, 756 (Utah 
1985). On the other hand, delays that do not have good cause, and therefore do not 
justify bringing a defendant to trial after the 120-day period, include those caused by 
court administrative errors,14 those caused by a prosecutor's inaction,15 and those caused 
by a prosecutor's passive acceptance of delayed scheduling. Coleman. 2001 UT App 
281,^14. 
Once a trial court determines whether a delay is justified by good cause, it must 
12
 State v. Maestas. 815 P.2d 1319, 1322 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
13
 Coleman. 2001 UT App 281,1|8. 
14Heaton,958P.2dat915. 
15
 Petersen. 810 P.2d at 426. 
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determine whether to go to trial or dismiss the case. The statute mandates that cases with 
unjustifiable delays be dismissed: 
In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within 
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves 
to dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court 
finds that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard 
within the time required is not supported by good cause, whether a 
previous motion for continuance was made or not, the court shall order the 
matter dismissed with prejudice. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4) (1999). 
If the trial court tries a case after the 120-day period has elapsed, the issue of 
whether there was good cause for the delay may be reviewed on appeal. Appellate review 
of such an issue involves a two-step process. First, it should be determined when the 
120-day period commenced and when it expired. Second, if the trial was held outside the 
120-day period, it must be determined whether "good cause" excused the delay. 
Coleman, 2001 UT App 281,1J6; Heaton. 958 P.2d at 916. If it did not, the conviction 
must be reversed whether there is a showing of prejudice or not. Petersen . 810 P.2d at 
427. 
In this case, the first step of the process, determining when the 120-day period 
commenced and when it ended, is easy. That is because it was undisputed below that the 
120-day period began on December 14, 2001, and ended 120 days later on April 12, 
2002. R. 85-87, 271 [6], 272 [18]. Further, a review of the record shows that this 
stipulation is soundly based. The "Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending 
16 
Charge[s]M was executed on December 8, 2001, and was stamped "received" by the 
prison records office on December 14, 2001. R. 13. The 120-day period, therefore, began 
December 14th because delivery to an authorized agent at the prison triggers the 120-day 
period.16 Taking this date, then, and adding 120 days shows that the deadline was April 
12, 2001.17 
However, the trial did not occur until April 24, 2002, twelve days past the 120-day 
deadline. So, under the second step of the test, it must be determined whether good cause 
justified the lateness of the trial. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, [^6. 
There were three separate delays in this case, and none of them were justified by 
good cause. This will be shown in the three sub-sections below. The first sub-section 
shows that the first delay, which was caused by the prison's failure to transport Mr. 
Houston to the continuation of the preliminary hearing, R. 255 [46-47], did not toll the 
120-day period. The second sub-section shows that the second delay was caused by the 
State's poorly-timed Motion for a Joint Trial. R. 31-39. Because State-caused delays are 
not supported by good cause under the 120-day statute, this delay did not toll the 120-day 
period. The third sub-section shows that the third delay was caused by the State's failure 
to give the statutorily-required 30-day notice of expert testimony at trial, R. 272 [5-7], 
16
 Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1) (1999); Coleman. 2001 UT App 281, %6 n.7; Heaton, 958 
P.2dat916. 
17
 2001 was not a leap year. See http://iavascript.internet.com/calculators/leap-vear.html 
(calculating whether any given year is a leap year). 
17 
and so the 120-day period was not tolled during this delay. 
In these circumstances, the late trial cannot be justified, and Mr. Houston's 
conviction should be reversed. Alternatively, this case should be remanded for thorough 
findings and conclusions regarding the first and second delays in this case, and whether 
they had good cause. 
A. The First Delay was Caused by an Administrative Error and does not 
Toll the 120-dav Period 
The first delay, which occurred between January 16 th and 24th, was not justified 
because it was due to the prison's failure to transport Mr. Houston to a hearing, and this 
was not Mr. Houston's fault.18 Therefore, the 120-day period was not tolled between the 
16th and 24th. 
It all began on the first day of the preliminary hearing, which was January 15, 
2002. R. 255. The court heard testimony from two witnesses, and then had to leave. The 
court suggested reconvening at lunchtime. Id. at 44. However, neither the State nor the 
defense could meet then. IcL. The judge then suggested reconvening on January 24th, but 
the State informed the court that a 120-day disposition request had been received and it 
wished to reconvene as soon as possible. Id. at 45. So, the continuance was scheduled for 
18
 See Coleman. 2001 UT App 281, ^ 6 ("A finding of good cause that will excuse failure 
of the prosecution to bring a defendant to trial within the time required means (1) delay caused by 
the defendant - such as asking for a continuance; or (2) a relatively short delay caused by 
unforeseen problems arising immediately prior to trial.'1) (quotations omitted). 
18 
the following morning, January 16 . Id. 
Unfortunately, the prison did not transport Mr. Houston for the continuance. Id_ at 
46-47. In discussing a new date for the continuance, the court noted that a number of jury 
trials were coming up, and again suggested reconvening on January 24th. Id at 47. This 
time the State readily agreed, and the date was set. IdL at 47-48. On the 24th, the 
continuance was held and Mr. Houston was bound over. IcL at 50, 93-94. 
The delay between the 16th and 24th must be counted towards the 120-day period 
because it was not a good-cause delay. In other words, it was not a delay caused by Mr. 
Houston. Further, the delay was not caused by an unforeseen problem arising 
immediately before trial. Indeed, this delay occurred well before trial and was not even 
necessarily unforeseen because the prison needs more than one day's notice to transport a 
prisoner. Id at 46. 
What is more, the Utah Supreme Court has already settled the question of whether 
administrative errors such as this toll the 120 days. Specifically, they do not. Heaton., 958 
P.2d at 915. This is because the 120-day disposition statute places the burden of moving 
the case forward solely on the prosecutor. IcL This has been emphasized by the case law. 
In the Utah Supreme Court case of State v. Heaton. the Court considered the issue 
of whether a delay caused by a court clerk's neglect in failing to docket the case was 
supported by good cause. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915. The Court determined that it was not 
because the prosecutor has a duty to compel the case forward regardless of such glitches: 
19 
The mere fact that the delay was not caused by the prosecutor has never 
been considered dispositive because to hold that good cause is supported 
by the lone fact that the delay was not caused by the prosecutor would 
contradict the language in section 77-29-1(4) which places the burden of 
complying with the statute on the prosecution. 
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915. The Court also noted that, while administrative mistakes are 
regrettable, the prosecutor's office must operate independently of administrative 
agencies. IdL It must work on its own to push the case forward. Id. 
The recent case of State v. Coleman is also on point. In that case, the defendant 
had made a routine request for a delay of the preliminary hearing. Coleman, 2001 UT 
App 281, TJ14. A 120-day disposition notice filed by the defendant had not yet been 
received, and the prosecutor agreed to the delay. Id. Upon review, this Court found that 
the State did not take its responsibility to move the case forward seriously enough: 
the prosecution, knowing that it had or could soon have an obligation to 
bring the matter to trial within 120 days, may not passively accept a 
defendant's delay of the preliminary hearing, and then turn around and 
claim the delay kept the prosecution from meeting its burden. 
Id. So, even when it has not received a 120-day disposition request, the prosecution still 
has some measure of responsibility to move the case forward. 
Other cases, such as State v. Petersen19 and State v. Taylor20 have also recognized 
that the 120-day disposition statute places the burden of moving the case forward on the 
prosecutor. Administrative glitches or not, the prosecutor must still bring the defendant 
19
 Petersen, 810 P.2d at 426. 
20
 Taylor, 538 P.2d at 312-13. 
20 
to trial within 120 days. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4) (1999). It is only those delays 
caused by the defendant or by unforeseen problems just before trial that toll the 120 days. 
Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, [^6. And, the prison's failure to transport Mr. Houston in 
this case does not fall into either of these categories. 
Nobody denies that the prison's failure to transport Mr. Houston was not the 
prosecutor's fault. However, as explained in Coleman and Heaton, that is not the point. 
The prosecutor still has the responsibility of moving the case along, and administrative 
errors do not relieve the prosecutor of this burden. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915. Therefore, 
this time counts towards the 120 days and, along with the other delays, shows that Mr. 
Houston's conviction should be reversed.21 
B. The Second Delay was Caused by the State's Motion for Joint Trial with 
Dual Juries, so it is not Justified by Good Cause 
The second delay that occurred in this case also does not toll the 120 days because 
it was a delay caused by the State. The State, on the day of the arraignment, February 11, 
2002, filed a motion requesting that Mr. Houston be tried jointly with his co-defendant, 
21
 Notably, the trial court did not make any legal or factual findings regarding this delay. 
R. 271 [6-8]; 272 [10-14]. However, the record of facts on this point is thorough, R. 255 [44-50], 
and the determination of whether the prison's failure to transport Mr. Houston constitutes good 
cause for a delay is a legal determination. See Heaton. 958 P.2d at 915 (whether administrative 
errors constitute good cause requires an interpretation of 77-29-1(4)). Therefore, this Court may 
properly reach this question. 
However, should this Court determine that more facts are needed, Mr. Houston requests 
that this case be remanded for further findings and conclusions regarding this delay. 
21 
Gabriel Valenzuela. R. 31-39. This necessitated a continuance of the arraignment so that 
either Mr. Houston or Mr. Valenzuela could be appointed conflict counsel. 
The reason conflict counsel was required was that the State's motion had placed 
Mr. Houston's interests in immediate conflict with Mr. Valenzuela's. Mr. Valenzuela had 
given the police a confession implicating Mr. Houston, R. 256 [140-48], and such a 
circumstance presents unique constitutional and evidentiary issues. In such 
circumstances, each defendant must have uncompromised, independent advice. So, Mr. 
Houston and Mr. Valenzuela could no longer both be represented by the Salt Lake Legal 
Defender's Association, as they had to that point.22 
Notwithstanding, the trial court found that the 120 days were tolled during this 
period of time. R. 271 [6]. The court did not attribute the delay to either party, but held 
that, because the appointment of conflict counsel was necessary, the delay was 
reasonable: 
there was a delay at the arraignment because there needed to be conflict 
counsel. And again, I don't know that it is necessary that I actually attribute 
to one side or the other what the delay was, but it is clear that with the two 
defendants still pending trial that there needed to be a conflict counsel. And 
that certainly does not unreasonably delay the case.23 
22
 State v. Humphrey. 793 P.2d 918, 923 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 
65, 72-75 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Mr. Houston was represented by David P.S. Mack of the Salt 
Lake Legal Defender's Association, R. 9, and Mr. Valenzuela was represented by Patrick L. 
Anderson of the Salt Lake Legal Defender's Association. R. 255 [2]. 
23
 R. 271 [6]. The court made a similar statement in the March 11th hearing wherein the 
State asked for a continuance. R. 272 [11]. Besides that, there are no other findings to review on 
this point. The record does contain some Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R. 133-36, 
22 
The trial court's ruling is faulty for two reasons. First, the trial court applied the 
wrong standard in deciding to toll the 120 days. Second, and most importantly, the court 
did not take into consideration the reason for the immediate need for conflict counsel.24 
The court's first error, applying the reasonableness standard instead of the "good 
cause1' standard, is demonstrated by the 120-day disposition statute. Under the 120-day 
disposition statute, continuances may be granted only for "good cause shown in open 
court . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(3) (1999). In the next paragraph, the statute again 
says that a delay cannot be justified without the support of "good cause." Utah Code 
but since they are unsigned, unstamped, and undated, they cannot be considered court-issued. 
There was some discussion about these findings and conclusions at the April 22nd hearing, but 
they were never signed and filed. R. 271 [8-9]. Appellate counsel attempted to supplement the 
record with signed, stamped, and dated findings and conclusions, and this Court issued an order 
for the supplementation, R. 268, but no such document was added to the record. R. 259-70. 
Appellate counsel was informed by the third district appellate clerk that this was not found in the 
record. So, the only findings and conclusions that may be reviewed in this case are those made 
orally by the trial court at the March 11th and April 22nd hearings. R. 271 [6-9]; 272 [10-18]. 
24
 The trial court's ruling is reviewed for correctness. See Petersen, 810 P.2d at 424 
("Questions of law are reviewed for correctness.") This is because, as a matter of law, the court 
applied a reasonableness standard rather than the correct, "good cause" standard which is 
required by the 120-disposition statute and the interpretive case law. R. 271 [6]; Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-29-1(3) & (4) (1999); Coleman. 2001 UT App 281,1J6; Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915. And, while 
the overall issue in this case is reviewed for abuse of discretion, the trial court does "not have 
discretion to misapply the law." Colemaa 2001 UT App 281, Tfl7 n.l 1 (quotations omitted). 
Further, the court made no findings of fact on this point. So, the clearly erroneous 
standard is not applied. Of course, the court should have made factual findings because such 
findings are helpful in determining whether this delay was attributable to Mr. Houston. Id. at ^ 6. 
The record contains enough information, though, to demonstrate that this delay was not caused 
by Mr. Houston. 
Nonetheless, should this Court determine that the record is insufficient, this case should 
be remanded for findings on this point. 
23 
Ann. § 77-29-1(4) (1999). The only time reasonableness is mentioned in the statute is 
when it indicates that the continuance may be for a "reasonable" length of time. Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-29-1(3) (1999). But this refers, of course, to the length of the 
continuance, not the justification for the continuance. Id. So, the "good cause" standard, 
rather than the "reasonableness" standard, should have been applied. 
This is further supported by the case law. This Court and the Utah Supreme Court 
have repeatedly emphasized that it is the "good cause" standard which applies in cases 
like this. Without exception, this is the standard which has been used to determine 
whether a delay tolls the 120-day period, and the standard has never been confused with 
a reasonableness standard or otherwise diluted.25 And, as has already been noted, the 
good-cause standard justifies a delay only if it was caused by the defendant, or by 
unforseen problems arising just before trial. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, }^6; Petersen, 
810 P.2d at 426. Other matters are inconsequential unless they are related to these 
questions in some way. 
With this, the trial court's second error becomes apparent. That is, the trial court 
did not take into account the reason for the immediate need for conflict counsel and the 
postponement of the arraignment. In fact, the court even said that it didn't find it 
necessary to attribute this delay to the actions of "one side or the other." R. 271 [6]. This 
25
 Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915; Petersen. 810 P.2d at 425; State v. Peterson. 2002 UT App 53, 
H8, 42 P.3d 1258; Coleman. 2001 UT App 281,1J6; Pathammavong. 860 P.2d at 1005; Maestas. 
815P.2datl321. 
24 
was error because the reason for the immediate need for conflict counsel and the 
postponement of the arraignment was crucial to the determination of whether the delay 
was justified by good cause. If the delay was caused by Mr. Houston, it was supported by 
good cause. If it was caused by anyone other than Mr. Houston, the 120-day period 
should not have been tolled. And, a review of the record shows that this delay was not 
caused by Mr. Houston. 
The record shows that, until the originally-scheduled arraignment on February 
11th, Mr. Houston had been prosecuted with his co-defendant, Gabriel Valenzuela.26 The 
Information listed them as co-defendants, R. 3, and both were appointed attorneys from 
the Salt Lake Legal Defender's Association. R. 9, 255 [2]. The preliminary hearing was 
held jointly, R. 255 [4], and both men were bound over. IdL_ at 93. The arraignment for 
both was scheduled for February 11th. R. 259. 
However, on February 11th, the State filed a "Motion for Joint Trial with Dual 
Juries." R. 31-39. This immediately placed the interests of Mr. Houston and Mr. 
Valenzuela in conflict because Mr. Valenzuela had given a confession which implicated 
Mr. Houston in this crime. R. 31, 256 [138-148]. In these circumstances, trials are 
usually held separately. Then, the out-of-court confession is not admitted at the trial of 
the non-confessing defendant unless the confessor appears in court for cross-
26
 This joint prosecution was, at that point, permissible under section 77-8a-l of the Utah 
Code, which provides that defendants may be charged in the same Information "if they are 
alleged to have participated in the same act or conduct or in the same criminal episode." Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-8a-l(2)(b) (1999). 
25 
examination. Bruton v. United States. 391 U.S. 123, 135-37 (1968). This is because such 
confessions are "inevitably suspect1' and they cannot be brought to the jury's attention 
without, at the very least, the opportunity to cross-examine the confessor. IcL_ at 136. In 
Utah, in fact, such defendants may not be tried together without an explicit court order 
allowing the procedure. Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l(3)(a) (1999). And so it was not 
foreseeable that the State would wish to try Mr. Houston and Mr. Valenzuela together, or 
that it would file the Motion on the day of the arraignment. 
After the State filed its Motion for a Joint Trial with Dual Juries, however, an 
immediate conflict arose between Mr. Houston and his co-defendant. On one hand, Mr. 
Houston's right to the confrontation of the witnesses against him stood to be 
compromised by Mr. Valenzuela's out-of-court confession emphasizing that Mr. 
Houston was the more culpable person in the crime. R. 256 [140-46]. On the other hand, 
it was in Mr. Valenzuela's interest to admit the confession and possibly obtain a more 
favorable verdict or sentence.27 This conflict necessitated the immediate need for the 
appointment of conflict counsel for either Mr. Houston and Mr. Valenzuela because each 
needed uncompromised, independent advice on everything from trial strategy, to plea 
27
 In fact, Mr. Valenzuela did obtain a more favorable circumstance. He accepted the offer 
of a second-degree robbery conviction, which was more favorable than the first-degree 
aggravated robbery charge which he faced. R. 256 [148]; R. 3-4. At trial, he testified that he 
blamed Mr. Houston for the crime M[t]o get a deal." Id. at 148. 
26 
officers, to evidence, and the arraignment.28 Accordingly, the arraignment was postponed 
to allow for this. 
All of this shows that, even though it was the defense who needed to arrange for 
conflict counsel,29 this circumstances was necessitated by the State's unexpected filing of 
its Motion for a Joint Trial. The State caused this delay. The State could have filed its 
motion for a joint trial before the arraignment, thereby allowing conflict counsel to be 
appointed in time for the scheduled arraignment. Or, it could have filed the motion after 
the arraignment, thereby saving the need for a postponement. Indeed, it should have 
taken one of these courses because it is responsible for moving the case along. Heaton . 
958 P.2d at 915. However, the State filed its motion on the day of the arraignment, and 
this necessitated a postponement. Days were lost in bringing Mr. Houston to trial, and 
this delay is not attributable to Mr. Houston. 
In sum, the 120-day period should not be tolled between the original arraignment 
28
 See Rule of Prof. Cond. 1.7 (2002) ("(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation of that client will be directly adverse to another client, unless: (1) The lawyer 
reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the relationship with the other 
client; and (2) Each client consents after consultation, (b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if 
the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to 
another client or to a third person or by the lawyer's own interest, unless: (1) The lawyer 
reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and (2) Each client consents 
after consultation. When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the 
consultation shall include explanation to each client of the implications of the common 
representation and the advantage and risks involved.") 
29
 In some cases a continuance granted to allow for the appointment of conflict counsel 
tolls the 120 days because it is a delay attributable to the defense. Phathammavong. 860 P.2d at 
1004; Maestas, 815 P.2d at 1321. But in this case that is not true; here it was the State which 
caused this delay. 
27 
date of February 11 and the postponement date of February 25 th. This delay is not 
attributable to Mr. Houston was necessitated by the State's arraignment-day filing of a 
"Motion for a Joint Trial with Dual Juries.1' R. 31-39. So, this delay, along with the 
others, shows that the late trial is not justifiable, and Mr. Houston's conviction should be 
reversed. 
Alternatively, Mr. Houston asks that this case be remanded for findings of fact 
relevant to this delay. The trial court did not make such findings, R. 271 [6], and even 
though the record contains enough information to demonstrate that this delay was not 
caused by Mr. Houston, factual findings could more fully demonstrate this. Therefore, if 
this Court decides not to reverse Mr. Houston's conviction, he asks that this case be 
remanded for thorough findings. 
C. The Third Delay was Caused by the State's Failure to Give the Required 
Expert-Witness Notice, so it is not Justified by Good Cause 
The third delay, which is the one which took the trial past the 120-day deadline, 
was not justified by good cause. This is because it was not caused by Mr. Houston or by 
unforeseen circumstances. It was caused by the State's request for a trial postponement 
from the original dates of March 13 th, 14th, and 15th, R. 260, to April 24 th, 25th, and 26th. 
R. 66. So, because State-caused delays are not justifiable, Mr. Houston's conviction must 
be reversed. 
The State asked for the postponement because it failed to give Mr. Houston the 
28 
statutorily-required 30-day notice that it intended to call an expert witness at trial. This 
notice is required by section 77-17-13 of the Utah Code, and indicates that ffthe party 
intending to call the expert shall give notice to the opposing party as soon as practicable 
but not less than 30 days before t r ia l . . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(l)(a) (1999). In 
this case, the State did not send the notice of expert witnesses until February 27th, 2002, 
only fourteen days before the scheduled trial. R. 41-42. 
This was brought to the court's attention at the pretrial conference on March 11 th. 
R. 272 [4-5]. At that conference, the State asked for a continuance to allow for the 
passage of the 30 days. IcL However, the defense counsel refused to agree, asserting that 
Mr. Houston would not waive his right to be tried within 120 days. IcL at 12-13. The 
defense counsel also pointed out that the State had possessed the experts' reports at least 
from the time of the preliminary hearing,30 and there had been ample time to notify the 
defense if it intended to call these witnesses. R. 272 [6-7]. But the State did not do this. 
Id. In these circumstances, the defense counsel argued, the State should simply forego the 
experts' testimonies. Id at 7. 
3
 The experts' reports, at least most of them, had been provided to the defense counsel at 
the preliminary hearing. Id. at 9. However, providing the reports does not meet the statutory 
requirements under section 77-17-13 of the Utah Code. This is because the reports themselves do 
not inform the defense that this information will be presented at trial. The defense must be 
specifically informed whether they will presented because the defense needs time to "examine 
the testing procedures used by the experts and compare them with other testing methods, hire 
[an] expert to challenge the testing procedures, and examine the resumes of the experts and 
possibly impugn their qualifications." State v. Tolano. 2001 UT App 37, ^ 8, 19 P.3d 400. So, 
merely receiving the reports is inadequate under the statute. Id. at [^19. 
29 
In evaluating these arguments, the court opined that the prosecution had shown 
diligence by providing the expert notification two days after the arraignment. Id_ at 14. 
So, the court ruled, the experts' testimonies should be allowed. Id. The only question, the 
court said, was whether the defense would be prepared for the expert witnesses' 
testimonies by the trial date. Id at 12. If not, the trial would be postponed to allow for the 
30 days, and any resulting delay would be considered reasonable. Id. at 12-14. 
The defense counsel disagreed with this view of the situation. He emphasized 
again that Mr. Houston would not waive the 120-day disposition right or the notification 
right, Id at 13, and expressed dismay at being forced to chose between the right to 120-
day disposition and the 30-day notice request. Id. at 16. 
Nonetheless, the court said the expert testimony would be allowed, and that the 
defense counsel needed to decide whether he wanted the 30 days to prepare or could 
simply confront the expert at the already-scheduled trial. IcL at 13-14. The defense 
counsel, after consultation with his office, said that he was not prepared to confront the 
expert witnesses. Id at 16. But he also emphasized that the appropriate remedy here 
would be either exclusion of the expert witnesses or a continuance within the 120-day 
period. Id 
The court then ruled that the trial would be postponed to allow for passage of the 
30 days required by the expert witness notification statute. Id. at 17-18. The court based 
this ruling on its finding that the State had not acted in bad faith: 
30 
It is true that I have ruled that I will not exclude the testimony or the expert 
witnesses based on the noncompliance with the 30 days because I just 
simply did not find the bad faith necessary in the failure to comply with the 
30-day notice. The State has done it as quickly as they can in the trial 
setting. And so by not excluding the testimony, or excluding the witnesses I 
guess, by default, I guess that means I am granting the continuance and it is 
to the requesting party. 
Id at 17. Importantly, however, the court also acknowledged that this delay was 
attributable to the State. Id at 17-18. Additionally, because Mr. Houston did not waive 
the 120-day disposition right, the trial would be rescheduled as soon as possible. IdL at 
17. 
Unfortunately, the trial was scheduled for April 24 th, 25th, and 26th, days past the 
April 12th deadline.31 Naturally, the defense counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss, R. 143-
48, and a hearing on the Motion was scheduled. At the hearing, the trial court incorrectly 
used a reasonableness standard in determining that the delay was justified: 
I need to weigh everything and decide what is reasonable and what is not 
reasonable. And in fact that is why the findings that I need to make are not 
just whether or not it was one party or the other who made a mistake, or 
one party or the other who didn't comply. I need to be able to look at all of 
the circumstances and see whether or not the delay is reasonable. 
R. 271 [6]. Then, the trial court summarized its conclusions from the March 11 th 
31
 To allow for 30 days between the notice of an expert witness and the trial, the trial 
could not be scheduled until after March 29th. See R. 41-42 (30 days after the file date of 
February 27th, 2002 was Friday, March 29th, 2002). The next week, which was the first week of 
April, was unavailable because the defense counsel was out of town. R. 272 [18]. Then, the 
following week, the court was on the "mast arraignment calendar" and could not schedule the 
trial. M. at 19. Friday of that week was April 12th, the last day of the 120 days. The court also 
could not schedule trial the week of the 15th because it was on the "master pretrial calendar." Id. 
at 19. So, the trial was scheduled for the 24th, 25th, and 26th. Id at 20. 
31 
conference, saying that it was not unreasonable to schedule trial beyond the 120-day 
deadline because the defense counsel had needed to time to prepare for the expert 
testimony. IdL at 7. Then, the trial court denied the Motion.32 
The trial court's denial of the Motion was error. This is because, as with its 
evaluation of the arraignment postponement, the trial court erroneously applied a 
reasonableness standard, rather than the statutorily-mandated "good cause" standard. R. 
271 [7-8]. Secondly, the trial court's interpretation of the requirements under the 30-day 
expert-notice statute is incorrect. Finally, the trial court ignored options that would have 
allowed Mr. Houston all of his constitutional rights, rather than requiring him to chose 
between them.33 
The first error, which was applying the incorrect reasonableness standard, is 
particularly damaging. That is because this standard focuses merely on whether a delay is 
32
 R. 271 [8]. As noted in the previous sub-section, the State drafted some findings of fact 
and conclusions of law on this subject, R. 130-32, but they were not signed or filed. So, they are 
not included in this discussion. 
33
 The trial court's rulings on this delay should be reviewed for correctness because all of 
the related rulings were interpretations of law. The court's application of a reasonableness 
standard rather than the correct "good cause" standard was legal error, and the court's 
interpretation of the requirements under the 30-day expert-notice requirement statute was a legal 
determination. So, the correctness standard applies. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 914 ("We review the 
trial court's legal determinations for correctness."); Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, ^ [3 n.3 ("legal 
determinations concerning the proper interpretation of the statute which grants the trial court 
discretion are reviewed for correctness."); Petersen, 810 P.2d at 424 ("Questions of law are 
reviewed for correctness.") 
32 
understandable in light of the legal requirements.34 But that is not the point; many types 
34
 In applying a reasonableness standard, the trial court considered factors relating to 
whether the delay was understandable in the circumstances. R. 271 [7]. This is shown by, among 
other things, the court's consideration of whether the prosecutor's filing of the notice was 
"disingenuous," whether the circumstances in general showed bad faith, and whether Mr. 
Houston wanted the 30 days to prepare for the expert testimony: 
The expert discovery issue is a little bit more problematic just in that there are 
some very specific statutory requirements that the State needs to make in order to 
meet their discovery requirements. They are required to bring in an expert witness. 
And again, Mr. Burmester apparently has met those requirements as far as giving 
the explanation and even attempted to give all of the information as quickly as this 
matter was set, but the matter was not set out 30 days. The first trial date was 
within 20 days, so we technically could not make that 30-day notice requirement. 
Now whether he could have provided that information, even before I had set it for 
trial, is what Mr. Mack is arguing, and because of the fact that this has been 
presumed that it was going, and it has looked like it was going to trial, the 
defendant has wanted it to go to trial, and everybody has anticipated that it is 
going to go to trial, is meaningful argument but I do not think it is reasonable to 
say that it was not even bound over and any appearance before me and set for any 
trial date. I am not finding that their failure to comply was disingenuous because 
they really had to give what information they can and simply did not meet the 
technical requirement of the 30-day notice because the trial was set sooner than 30 
days. 
They said they gave the information as quick as they could and even then the 
remedy for that is not to keep out the evidence but the remedy for that is a 
continuance. And I asked the defendant at that time, given the fact that we had 
two conflicting issues for a delay, as whether he wanted the time to have that 
expert testimony information, or if he wanted to stay the 120-day time period. 
And Mr. Mack talked with his office, discussed it with Mr. Houston, looked into 
the issues and determined that they did in fact need the time to correlate and 
adequately prepare. 
Again, that is not unreasonable, and again, it was not something that I am 
therefore saying that the delay was on the part of the defendant. I am simply 
looking at all of the circumstances and finding that under those facts, without 
stating that the delay was specifically to the defendant, or specifically to the State, 
that under all of those facts it was reasonable to give everyone time they needed to 
meet the statutory requirements of expert notice, and that the delay was not 
unreasonable to reset this trial. 
33 
of delays could be understandable. Yet, that does not mean that they justify 
compromising a defendant's speedy trial rights as they are articulated in the 120-day 
disposition statute. Constitutionally and statutorily, the prosecutor has the burden of 
moving a case forward, and this burden is not relieved simply because an understandable 
delay arises. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(3) & (4) (1999); Heaton. 958 P.2d at 915; 
Petersen, 810 P.2d at 424. 
As has already been shown, it is the "good cause" standard, rather than a 
reasonableness standard, which applies. The "good cause" standard is mandated in two 
places in the 120-day disposition statute. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(3) & (4) (1999). 
Further, this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have consistently applied the "good 
cause" standard in evaluations of delays.35 This means that delays are justified only if 
they are caused by the defendant or unforseen problems arising just before trial. 
Coleman. 2001 UT App 281, [^6; Petersen, 810 P.2d at 426. 
Applying the good cause standard shows that the postponement of the trial was 
not justified. This is because the postponement was not caused by Mr. Houston, it was 
caused by the prosecutor's failure to give 30-day notice that it intended to call expert 
witnesses at trial. R. 41-42, 271 [7-8], 272 [4-7]. Also, this was not an unforeseen 
problem. The prosecutor was fully aware that, by statute, 30-day notice of expert 
R.271 [7-8]. 
35
 Heaton. 958 P.2d at 915; Petersen. 810 P.2d at 425; Peterson. 2002 UT App 53,1J8; 
Coleman. 2001 UT App 281, T|6; Pathammavong. 860 P.2d at 1005; Maestas. 815 P.2d at 1321. 
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testimony was required. R. 272 [4-5]; Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (1999). He was also 
aware that a request for 120-day disposition had been filed. R. 255 [44]. Knowing that he 
had to meet both time-sensitive requirements, he should have sent the notice quickly and 
worked to keep the trial within the 120-day period. However, he did not and this caused 
the postponement of the trial from its original dates of March 13th, 14th, and 15 th to April 
24th, 25th, and 26th. This was days after the April 12th deadline, and so this case should 
have been dismissed. 
The trial court's conclusion to the contrary is erroneous not only because the court 
applied the incorrect reasonableness standard, as shown above, but also because of a 
second error it made in its evaluation. That is, the trial court erroneously interpreted the 
requirements of the 30-day notification statute and relied upon this interpretation in 
justifying the delay of the trial. R. 271 [7-8], 272 [10-12, 17-18]. 
The trial court's interpretation was that the trial postponement was justified 
because trial was set only twenty days from the arraignment, and the prosecutor showed 
good faith by sending notice of the expert witnesses only two days after the arraignment, 
which occurred about a month after the bindover. R. 271 [7-8]. So, the trial court said, 
delaying the trial to allow the defense its time to prepare for the testimony was 
reasonable. R. 272 [17-18]. 
However, this reasoning is unsound. The notification statute does not allow a 
party to wait until after the arraignment, the trial scheduling, or any other event before 
35 
providing notice of the expert witness. Indeed, the statute does not tie the notification to 
any of these events. The statute merely provides that, in any event, a party intending to 
call an expert witness must give the opposing party notice at least 30 days before trial, 
and the notice must include the expert's name, address, resume, and report: 
(l)(a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify 
in a felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing held 
pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the party 
intending to call the expert shall give notice to the opposing party as soon 
as practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or ten days before the 
hearing. 
(b) Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, the expert's 
curriculum vitae, and a copy of the expert's report.36 
36
 Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(1) (1999). Subsequent sections outline the procedure once 
the expert notification is received: 
(2)(a) The expert shall prepare a written report relating to the proposed testimony, 
(b) If the expert has not prepared a report or the report does not adequately inform 
concerning the substance of the expert's proposed testimony including any 
opinion and the bases and reasons of that opinion, the party intending to call the 
expert shall provide to the opposing party a written explanation of the expert's 
anticipated testimony sufficient to give the opposing party adequate notice to 
prepare to meet the testimony, followed by a copy of any report prepared by the 
expert when available. 
(3) (a) As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's report, the party 
receiving notice shall provide to the other party notice of witnesses whom the 
party anticipates calling to rebut the expert's testimony, including the name and 
address of any expert witness and the expert's curriculum vitae. If available, a 
report of any rebuttal expert shall be provided to the other party, 
(b) If the rebuttal expert has not prepared a report or the report does not 
adequately inform concerning the substance of the expert's proposed testimony, or 
in the event the rebuttal witness is not an expert, the party intending to call the 
rebuttal witness shall provide a written explanation of the witness's anticipated 
rebuttal testimony sufficient to give the opposing party adequate notice to prepare 
to meet the testimony, followed by a copy of any report prepared by any rebuttal 
36 
Further, giving the opposing counsel a copy of the experts' reports, as the 
prosecutor did in this case, does not qualify as notice under the statute. Tolano , 2001 UT 
App 37, Tfl9; State v.Arellano, 964 P.2d 1167, 1171-72 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). This is 
because merely providing the report does not inform the opposing party that the expert 
will be called. Indeed, several experts, one expert, or no experts may produce reports for 
a case. However, this does not mean that any experts will testify, and "it is not 
defendant's duty to anticipate and prepare for all potential, yet undisclosed expert 
witnesses . . . . " Tolano. 2001 UT App 37, ^ fl 1 (citation omitted). So, only a 30-day 
notification that an expert will be called, along with the expert's name, address, resume, 
and report, qualifies under the statute. Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(1) (1999). 
Here, the prosecutor gave the defense counsel the experts' reports at the 
preliminary hearing. These reports included Gabriel Bier's blood evidence report and 
Todd Wrigley's DNA report, which were listed later in the "Notification of Expert 
Witness."37 Handing the defense counsel the reports, of course, did not meet the 
notification requirement because there was no notice stating that the experts would be 
expert when available. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(2) & (3) (1999). 
37
 The "Notice of Expert Witnesses" listed two experts: 1) Todd M. Rigley of the Utah 
Bureau of Forensic Services, who would testify about the DNA analysis, and 2) J. Gabriel Bier of 
the Utah Bureau of Forensic Services, who would testify about the blood evidence. R. 41. At the 
preliminary hearing, the prosecutor said he had given these reports to the defense counsel, and 
identified the experts by name. R. 272 [9]. 
37 
called as witnesses, plus the names, addresses, and resumes of the experts were not 
complete. Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(1) (1999); Tolano . 2001 UT App 37, ^ [11. 
Importantly, however, the fact that the prosecutor handed the defense counsel 
these reports shows that the prosecutor could have given proper notice as early as the 
preliminary hearing, which was nearly two months before the original trial dates. 
R. 272 [4-7]. But he did not. Id. 
This is not a case where an unforeseen convergence of dates placed the State in 
the impossible position of giving up this case either under the 120-day disposition 
statute, or under the 30-day notification statute. The State knew that both statutes were in 
play, and it could have, and should have, given notice of the expert witness as soon as 
possible to avoid going past the 120-day deadline. Indeed, if it is held that this is not 
required, then the speedy trial rights of the 120-day disposition statute would be crippled. 
The State could always avoid the 120-day deadline by waiting until just before trial to 
file a notice of expert witnesses. The defense counsel would then be required to forfeit 
either speedy trial or due process rights, and this is contrary to the purposes of the 120-
day disposition and 30-day notification statutes, as well as basic fairness. This 
circumstance should not be created. 
It is true that the appropriate remedy for failing to give the 30-day notification is a 
continuance to allow the opposing party time to prepare for the expert testimony: 
(4)(a) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to meet the requirements of 
this section, the opposing party shall be entitled to a continuance of the trial 
38 
or hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony, 
(b) If the court finds that the failure to comply with this section is the result 
of bad faith on the part of any party or attorney, the court shall impose 
appropriate sanctions. 
However, even though this language mandates a continuance where the 30-day notice 
requirement is not met by a party, it also "leaves some discretion with the trial court to 
consider the circumstances " Tolano, 2001 UT App 37, ^ [8. So, if another 
constitutional right, such as the right to a speedy trial, is involved in the case, the court 
should use its discretion to seek a solution which protects both rights. As the United 
States Supreme Court has declared, "we find it intolerable that one constitutional right 
should have to be surrendered in order to assert another."39 
38
 Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(4) (1999). The final section of the statute addresses expert 
testimony at preliminary hearings: 
(5)(a) For purposes of this section, testimony of an expert at a preliminary hearing 
held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure constitutes notice 
of the expert, the expert's qualifications, and a report of the expert's proposed trial 
testimony as to the subject matter testified to by the expert at the preliminary 
hearing. 
(b) Upon request, the party who called the expert at the preliminary hearing shall 
provide the opposing party with a copy of the expert's curriculum vitae as soon as 
practicable prior to trial or any hearing at which the expert may be called as an 
expert witness. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(5) (1999). 
39
 Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968). In Simmons, the criminal 
defendant motioned to suppress evidence. Id. at 381. In order to establish standing to make the 
motion, the defendant testified that he was the owner of some of the items of evidence. Id. He 
lost the motion to suppress, and the prosecutor entered his testimony as evidence at trial. Id. The 
United States Supreme Court held that this was intolerable because it forced the defendant to 
chose between his Fourth Amendment rights and the right to be free from self-incrimination. 
39 
Nonetheless, this is precisely what the trial court did. The trial court asked Mr. 
Houston to chose between his speedy trial and due process rights, as they are enunciated 
in the 120-day disposition and 30-day notification statutes. R. 272 [17-18]. This was 
inappropriate in these circumstances, particularly in light of the availability of other 
options that would preserve both Mr. Houston's rights. 
The trial court's failure to consider these options was its third evaluative error in 
the ruling on the trial postponement. These options included either: (1) foregoing the 
State's expert testimony, or (2) continuing trial after the 30 days pass but before the 120-
day deadline. The defense counsel, in objecting to infringement upon either the 120-day 
speedy trial right or the 30-day expert notification right, outlined both of these options to 
the trial court. 
However, the trial court would not consider foregoing the expert testimony. R. 
272 [12-13]. And then the trial court did not even schedule the trial before the 120-day 
deadline. This was partly because the defense counsel was out of town for the first week 
after the 30 days had passed, and partly the court was unavailable for the next two weeks. 
R. 272 [18-19]. Admittedly, delays made in part to accommodate defense counsels' 
schedules are often considered justified by good cause. Coleman. 2001 UT App 281, 
f^l 1. But here, the fact that the defense counsel was out of town for the first week after 
the 30-day notification period does not toll the 120 days. This is because the 
postponement itself was caused by the State's failure to file the required 30-day notice. 
40 
R. 41-42; 271 [7-8]; 272 [4-7]. If not for the State's oversight, the postponement would 
not have been necessary, and the defense counsel's schedule would have been irrelevant. 
Further, the trial court was more at fault than the defense counsel because it had conflicts 
for both the second or third weeks in April. R. 272 [18]. So, the period between the 
originally-scheduled trial dates and the time of trial should be included in the calculation 
of the 120-day time period. 
In sum, the trial court's conclusion that the postponement of the trial was a 
justifiable delay is error. None of the three delays in this trial, the postponement of the 
preliminary hearing continuance, the postponement of the arraignment, or the 
postponement of the trial, met the requirements for tolling the 120-days. So, Mr. 
Houston's conviction should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the above, Mr. Houston respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction for failure to prosecute within 120 days after the written request for 
disposition of charges. Alternatively, Mr. Houston requests that this case be remanded 
for further factual findings and conclusions on the first and second delays that occurred 
in this case. 
41 
SUBMITTED this if**- day of March, 2003. 
rU5^^^V4cP-v^D^\ 
HEATHER JOHNSON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
DAVID P.S. MACK 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, HEATHER JOHNSON, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered 
eight copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office, 160 
East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this 
* ? *** day of March, 2003 . 
.Q A^S-a^^ Q e & V N O * ^ 
HER JOHN 
DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney General's 
Office as indicated above this day of March, 2003. 
42 
ADDENDUM A 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD DALE HOUSTON, 
Defendant 
Custody: USP 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 011918410 FS 
Judge: ANN BOYDEN 
Date: July 1, 2002 
PRESENT 
Clerk: patd 
Reporter: SCHULTZ, KATHLEEN 
Prosecutor: BURMESTER, BYRON F 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MACK, DAVID 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: November 8, 1979 
Video 
Tape Number: VIDEO Tape Count: 93234 
CHARGES 
1. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 04/26/2002 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Page 1 
*N IV. 
Case No: 011918410 
Date: Jul 01, 2002 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
PRISON SENTENCE TO RUN CONSECTIVELY WITH TIME NOW SERVING AT UTAH 
STATE PRISON, 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
RECOMMEND CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED AT ADC FROM 10-30-01 
SENTENCE TRUST NOTE 
RESTITUTION TO BE PAID THRU BOARD OF PARDONS OF $50,302.32 JOINT & 
SEVERAL 
Dated this 3 day of ^^cA^ 20 4Z . 
4^. 
ANN B O Y D E N 7 
District Court Judge 
Page 2 (last) 
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ADDENDUM B 
THE TRIAL 77-17-13 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
tfoon recess 
Requirements. 
Separation. 
ffoon recess. 
* Excusing of jurors for noon hour after conclu-
sion of arguments of counsel was not a separa-
tion after the case was submitted to them. 
State v. Pacheco, 13 Utah 2d 148, 369 R2d 494 
(1962). 
Requirements. 
Statute contained two requirements: (1) that 
jury be kept together in some private and 
convenient place, and (2) that no one be permit-
ted to speak or communicate with jurors with-
out permission of court State v. Jarrett, 112 
Utah 335, 187 P.2d 547 (1947). 
Separation. 
Not every separation of a juror gave rise to 
claim of prejudice, since absolute isolation was 
not reasonably possible. State v. Jarrett, 112 
Utah 335, 187 P.2d 547 (1947). 
Statute did not prevent jurors from separa-
tion for purposes of necessity, such as to visit 
lavatory, and, while defendant's right to have 
jury secluded from outside influences while 
deliberating should be jealously guarded, law 
must have been construed in keeping with 
correlative rights of defendant and jurors. State 
v. Jarrett, 112 Utah 335, 187 P.2d 547 (1947). 
Where only separation of jury was for pur-
pose of necessity, under surveillance of bailiff, 
and there was no communication with any 
juror, prejudice would not be presumed. State v. 
Jarrett, 112 Utah 335, 187 P.2d 547 (1947). 
Where the separation of a jury was for the 
purposes of necessity, under surveillance of 
bailiff, and there was no communication with 
any juror, prejudice would not be presumed and 
the burden was on the defendant to establish 
that he was prejudiced by the alleged separa-
tion. State v. Rivenburgh, 11 Utah 2d 95, 355 
P.2d 689 (1960), cert, denied, 368 U.S. 922, 82 
S. Ct. 246, 7 L. Ed. 2d 137, appeal dismissed, 
368 U.S. 144, 82 S. Ct. 247, 7 L. Ed. 2d 188 
(1961). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am.Jur.2d.— 75B Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 1647 
et seq. 
C.J.S. — 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1362. 
A.L.R. — Prejudicial effect, in criminal case, 
of communications between witnesses and ju-
rors, 9 A.L.R.3d 1275. 
Juror's reading of newspaper account of trial 
in state criminal case during its progress as 
ground for mistrial, new trial, or reversal, 46 
A.L.R.4th 11. 
Criminal law: propriety of reassembling jury 
to amend, correct, clarify, or otherwise change 
verdict after jury has been discharged, or has 
reached or sealed its verdict and separated, 14 
A.L.R.5th 89. 
77-17-12. Defendant on bail appearing for trial may be 
committed. 
When a defendant who has given bail appears for trial, the court may, at any 
time after his appearance for trial, order him to be committed to the custody of 
the proper officer to await the judgment or further order of the court. 
History: C. 1953, 77-17-12, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 8 C.J.S. Bail § 136. 
77-17-13. Expert testimony generally — Notice require-
ments. 
(1) (a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify 
in a felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing 
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77-17-13 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the party 
intending to call the expert shall give notice to the opposing party as soon 
as practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or ten days before the 
hearing. 
(b) Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, the expert's 
curriculum vitae, and a copy of the expert's report. 
(2) (a) The expert shall prepare a written report relating to the proposed 
testimony. 
(b) If the expert has not prepared a report or the report does not 
adequately inform concerning the substance of the expert's proposed 
testimony including any opinion and the bases and reasons of that 
opinion, the party intending to call the expert shall provide to the opposing 
party a written explanation of the expert's anticipated testimony sufficient 
to give the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the 
testimony, followed by a copy of any report prepared by the expert when 
available. 
(3) (a) As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's report, the party 
receiving notice shall provide to the other party notice of witnesses whom 
the party anticipates calling to rebut the expert's testimony, including the 
name and address of any expert witness and the expert's curriculum vitae 
If available, a report of any rebuttal expert shall be provided to the other 
party. 
(b) If the rebuttal expert has not prepared a report or the report does 
not adequately inform concerning the substance of the expert's proposed 
testimony, or in the event the rebuttal witness is not an expert, the party 
intending to call the rebuttal witness shall provide a written explanation 
of the witness's anticipated rebuttal testimony sufficient to give the 
opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the testimony, followed 
by a copy of any report prepared by any rebuttal expert when available 
(4) (a) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to meet the requirements of 
this section, the opposing party shall be entitled to a continuance of the 
trial or hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony. 
(b) If the court finds that the failure to comply with this section is the 
result of bad faith on the part of any party or attorney, the court shall 
impose appropriate sanctions. 
(5) (a) For purposes of this section, testimony of an expert at a preliminary 
hearing held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
constitutes notice of the expert, the expert's qualifications, and a report of 
the expert's proposed trial testimony as to the subject matter testified to by 
the expert at the preliminary hearing. 
(b) Upon request, the party who called the expert at the preliminary 
hearing shall provide the opposing party with a copy of the experts 
curriculum vitae as soon as practicable prior to trial or any hearing at 
which the expert may be called as an expert witness. 
History: C. 1953, 77-17-13, enacted by L. nal Procedure" m Subsection (l)(a), divided 
1994, ch. 139, § 3; 1999, ch. 43, § 1. Subsections (1) to (4), adding (a) and (b) desig-
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend- nations, made two stylistic changes in Subsec 
ment, effective Ma> 3, 1999, inserted "held tion (3)(a), and added Subsection (5) 
pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Cnmi-
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THE JUDGMENT 77-17-13 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Effect of noncompliance. 
Expert's report. 
Failure to provide notice. 
—Harmless error. 
Effect of noncompliance. 
The trial court abused its discretion in deny-
ing defendant's motion for a continuance based 
on the state's failure to comply with the expert 
witness notice requirement of this section. 
State v. Arellano, 964 R2d 1167 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998). 
Expert's report. 
In a prosecution for sexual abuse, where the 
state failed to provide defendant with an ex-
pert's report until the afternoon of the first day 
of the trial, the trial court erred in denying a 
continuance and allowing the expert's testi-
mony. State v. Begishe, 937 P.2d 527 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997). 
Failure to provide notice. 
—Harmless error. 
Although the state failed to disclose an ex-
pert witness to the defendant at least 30 days 
before trial as required by this section, the 
error was harmless where the expert's testi-
mony was merely cumulative of other properly 
entered and unchallenged testimony and the 
outcome of the trial would not have been differ-
ent had the expert not testified. State v. 
Bredehofl, 966 R2d 285 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
CHAPTER 18 
THE JUDGMENT 
Section 
77-18-1. 
77-18-2. 
77-18-3. 
77-18-4. 
Suspension of sentence — Pleas 
held in abeyance — Probation 
— Supervision — Presen-
tence investigation — Stan-
dards — Confidentiality — 
Terms and conditions — Res-
titution — Termination, revo-
cation, modification, or exten-
sion — Hearings — Electronic 
monitoring. 
Repealed. 
Disposition of fines. 
Sentence — Term — Construc-
Section 
77-18-8.5, 
77-18-9. 
77-18-10. 
77-18-11. 
tion. 
77-18-5. Reports by courts and prosecut-
ing attorneys to Board of Par-
dons and Parole. 
77-18-5.5. Judgment of death — Defen-
dant to select method — Time 
of selection. 
77-18-6. Judgment to pay fine or restitu-
tion constitutes a lien. 
77-18-6.5. Liability of rescued person for 
costs of emergency response. 
77-18-7. Costs imposed on defendant — 
Restrictions. 
77-18-8. Fine not paid — Commitment. 
77-18-8.3. Special condition of sentence 
during incarceration — Pen-
alty. 
77-18-12. 
77-18-13. 
77-18-14. 
77-18-15. 
77-18-16. 
77-18-17. 
Special condition of probation — 
Penalty. 
Definitions. 
Petition — Expungement of 
records of arrest, investiga-
tion, and detention — Eligi-
bility conditions — No filing 
fee. 
Petition — Expungement of 
conviction — Certificate of eli-
gibility — Fee — Notice — 
Written evaluation — Objec-
tions — Hearing. 
Grounds for denial of certificate 
of eligibility — Effect of prior 
convictions. 
Hearing — Standard of proof — 
Exception. 
Order to expunge — Distribu-
tion of order — Redaction — 
Receipt of order — Adminis-
trative proceedings — Divi-
sion requirements. 
Retention of expunged records 
— Agencies. 
Penalty. 
Retroactive application. 
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ADDENDUM C 
DISPOSITION OF DETAINERS AGAINST PRISONERS 77-29-1 
CHAPTER 29 
DISPOSITION OF DETAINERS AGAINST 
PRISONERS 
Section 
77-29-1. 
77-29-2. 
77-29-3. 
77-29-4. 
77-29-5. 
Prisoner's demand for disposition 
of pending charge — Duties of 
custodial officer — Continuance 
may be granted — Dismissal of 
charge for failure to bring to 
trial. 
Duty of custodial officer to inform 
prisoner of untried indictments 
or informations. 
Chapter inapplicable to incompe-
tent persons. 
Escape of prisoner voids demand. 
Interstate agreement on detainers 
— Enactment into law — Text of 
agreement. 
Section 
77-29-6. 
77-29-7. 
77-29-8. 
77-29-9. 
77-29-10. 
77-29-11. 
Interstate agreement — "Appro-
priate court" defined. 
Interstate agreement — Duty of 
state agencies and political sub-
divisions to cooperate. 
Interstate agreement — Applica-
tion of habitual criminal law. 
Interstate agreement — Escape of 
prisoner while in temporary 
custody. 
Interstate agreement — Duty of 
warden. 
Interstate agreement — Attorney 
general as administrator and 
information agent. 
77-29-1. Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending 
charge — Duties of custodial officer — Continu-
ance may be granted — Dismissal of charge for 
failure to bring to trial. 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state 
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is 
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or informa-
tion, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in 
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying 
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting 
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge 
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice. 
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand 
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be 
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to 
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or 
custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified, 
provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of commit-
ment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested. 
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the 
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in 
open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any 
reasonable continuance. 
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within 
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to 
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that 
the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the 
time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for 
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with 
prejudice. 
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